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ESSAY
THE FLAG-BURNING CASE: FREEDOM OF
SPEECH WHEN WE NEED IT MOST
ARNOLD H. LOEWYt
I. MORAL LEGITIMACY
On June 22, 1989, the two leading stories on the front page of the New York
Times and many other American newspapers were "Justices, 5-4, Back Pro-
tester's Right To Burn The Flag"' and "Chinese Execute 3 In Public Display
For Protest Role."'2 To fully appreciate the interrelationship of these stories,
imagine the switch of one vote in the flag-burning case, Texas v. Johnson,3 so
that Texas had prevailed. The first New York Times headline might have read:
"Justices, 5-4, Uphold Imprisonment For Protester Who Burned The Flag." A
neutral newspaper such as the Tokyo Times might have had the following head-
line: "Chinese and American Protesters Convicted."
Lest there be any doubt about the similarity of the protests, compare the
perspective of the protesters. Respondent Gregory Johnson and his friends per-
ceived themselves to be international Communists, who were generally pro-
testing the renomination of President Ronald Reagan at the 1984 Republican
National Convention and specifically protesting the American flag as a symbol
of international oppression. 4 The Chinese demonstrators were making a demo-
cratic challenge to Communist oppression. Only the most chauvinistic Ameri-
can could claim that a Communist's challenge to United States policies differs in
principle from a democratic challenge to Chinese policies.
Relevant differences, of course, do exist between Johnson's original convic-
tion and the Chinese convictions. First, the severity of the penalties is strikingly
different. 5 Second, Johnson had greater procedural protection. His case
reached the Supreme Court nearly five years after his protest. During that inter-
val, three other courts heard his case. 6 Finally, Johnson's conviction limited
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1. See, e.g., N.Y. Times, June 22, 1989, at 1, col. 5.
2. See, e.g., id. at col. 4.
3. 109 S. Ct. 2533 (1989). The Court in Johnson held that it was unconstitutional under the
first amendment to convict Johnson under a Texas flag desecration statute. Id. at 2548.
4. Id. at 2536-37.
5. At Johnson's trial, he was sentenced to one year in prison. Id. at 2537. Some of the Chi-
nese demonstrators were executed; others were sentenced to long prison terms. See N.Y. Times,
supra note 2, at I, col. 4.
6. A trial court convicted Johnson, an intermediate appellate court affirmed his conviction,
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only how he could protest, not whether he could protest. Such was not the case
with the Chinese protesters, some of whom were punished merely for speaking
and demonstrating.7 While these distinctions must be noted, they should not be
overemphasized. The first two relate to our commitment to proportional pun-
ishment and procedural due process. They are not related to freedom of speech
at all. The third distinction, though more significant, is still somewhat illusory.
If the Chinese students were punished for putting their Statue of Liberty in
Tiananmen Square8 on the ground that this particular form of criticism was too
inflammatory, we would not have been satisfied with the explanation that only
one form of protest had been stifled. At best we would have considered it only
slightly less offensive than an outright ban on dissent. It is, of course, easier to
see the impact of a "how" limitation-a limitation restricting the manner of
protest-when we support the dissenters.
Perhaps a true "how" limitation would not have seemed so bad to us. If the
Chinese generally prohibited erecting statues in Tiananmen Square, the impact
of that limitation on the right to dissent would have seemed more justifiable.
Those of us who love the flag and all that it represents may be tempted to accept
Johnson's conviction as analogous to such an anti-statue statute.
Unfortunately, such reasoning does not wash. Texas did not forbid all
American flag burning, only that which the burner "knows will seriously offend
one or more persons likely to observe or discover his actions."9 We would not
be pleased with a Chinese conviction predicated on bringing a statue into the
Square by one who "knows that he will seriously offend one or more persons
likely to discover his action." More significantly, the Texas statute only pro-
tected the State or National flag. Consequently, one burning a foreign flag to the
horror of devotees of that country's policies could not be punished.10 To analo-
gize to the Chinese hypothetical, a law forbidding Statues of Liberty, but no
other statues, from being erected in Tiananmen Square would be far removed
from a "how" limitation on the right to dissent. I am not suggesting that all
"how" limitations are constitutionally permissible. Indeed, quite clearly all are
not.'I It is imperative, however, that we not sugarcoat a content-based, indeed
viewpoint-based, discrimination under the benign mantle of a mere manner of
protest regulation.
Another possible distinction between flag burning and the Chinese protests
is that we seek protection from the emotional trauma of a burning flag, whereas
706 S.W.2d 120 (Tex. App. 1986), and the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals reversed his conviction
on first amendment grounds, 755 S.W.2d 92 (Tex. Crim. App. 1988), affd, 109 S. Ct. 2533 (1989).
7. See Doerner, The Face of Repression, TIME, July 3, 1989, at 27.
8. Tiananmen Square is a large public square adjacent to the Chinese capital in Beijing.
9. TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 42.09(b) (Vernon 1974 & Supp. 1989).
10. Actually, "[o]n the same day as [Johnson's] arrest, a number of demonstrators burned the
national flag of a foreign country. This action lead (sic) to a physical brawl; nevertheless, no arrests
under section 42.09 were made in connection with the incident." State v. Johnson, 755 S.W.2d 92,
94 n.3 (Tex. Crim. App. 1988).
11. For example, in Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15 (1971), the Court held that a state cannot
ban certain language from public discourse even if it is prepared to do so uniformly. Id. at 26.
Consequently, it reversed the conviction of a man for wearing a jacket emblazoned with the words
"Fuck the Draft." Id. at 16-17.
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the Chinese government is worried about the dissenters' ideas being taken seri-
ously. Many efforts to punish free speech in America, however, are motivated
by a desire to protect our emotions rather than quiet our fears that obnoxious
ideas will prevail. 12 If such reasons were acceptable, little would be left of free-
dom of speech as we know it. Indeed, if such were the international standard, it
would not have been difficult for the Chinese leaders to have claimed that their
national psyche could not stand the emotional turmoil caused by the radical
students in Tiananmen Square.
Compare the other great suppression incident of 1989, Iran's call for the
execution of author Salman Rushdie, predicated entirely on the emotional im-
pact of his novel The Satanic Verses.13 As we listened to Iranian explanations of
the insult perpetrated upon Islam by this book, we recoiled in horror at their
lack of regard for freedom of speech.14 But I have little doubt that individual
citizens of that theocratic nation felt as much pain from Rushdie's words as our
most patriotic citizens felt from Johnson's flag burning.
It is surely no answer to say that Rushdie merely wrote words but Johnson
committed an act. It is the perceived assault from either message-not the
form-that causes the pain. Indeed, supporters of flag desecration laws typically
rely on the "fighting words" doctrine that allows convictions for verbal insults
uttered during face-to-face confrontations. 15 The only discernible distinction be-
tween the two situations is the rather ethnocentrically myopic view that our
sense of serious emotional insult is justified whereas theirs is not.
II. FLAG CONSECRATION: THE COURT'S OPINION
Near the end of Justice Brennan's opinion for the Court, he observed: "We
do not consecrate the flag by punishing its desecration, for in doing so we dilute
12. The Skokie litigation could be so categorized. See Collin v. Smith, 578 F.2d 1197 (7th
Cir.), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 916 (1978). The court in Collin struck down a Village of Skokie ordi-
nance making it a misdemeanor to disseminate any material promoting and inciting racial or reli-
gious hatred. Id. at 1207. Jewish survivors of the Holocaust tried to prevent a Nazi organization
from marching in front of the Skokie Village Hall while wearing Nazi uniforms complete with swas-
tikas. Id. at 1199. The Village argued that the "infliction of psychic trauma" on the residents was a
substantive evil that they had a right to prohibit, but the court rejected this argument. Id. at 1205-
07.
See also Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444 (1969). The Court in Brandenburg reversed the
defendant's conviction under an Ohio Criminal Syndicalism statute. Id. at 445. The defendant
spoke at a Ku Klux Klan rally in which participants, outfitted in hooded Klan regalia, burned a
large wooden cross. Id.
On the other hand, officials may have prosecuted some civil rights demonstrators out of fear
that the community would accept their ideas. See Cox v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 536 (1965). Even in
Cox, however, the emotional wound of seeing black students protesting racial segregation in the
South must have influenced the prosecution. The Supreme Court reversed the defendants' convic-
tions on free speech grounds. Id. at 558.
13. S. RUSHDIE, THE SATANIC VERSES (1988). For a full account of this worldwide contro-
versy, see Smith, The New Satans, TIME, March 6, 1989, at 36-38.
14. We also recoiled at their lack of regard for procedural or jurisdictional due process, and for
their lack of any sense of proportionality in punishment. As with the Chinese, however, these were
additional wrongs. We were independently upset with their disregard for freedom of speech.
15. See Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, 572 (1942). In his Johnson dissent, Chief
Justice Rehnquist relied on precisely that reasoning. Johnson, 109 S. Ct. at 2552-53 (Rehnquist,
C.J., dissenting) (discussed infra in text accompanying notes 35-37).
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the freedom that this cherished emblem represents." 16 The negative form of this
observation understates the significance of the decision. The Court could have
written: "By reversing the conviction of this flag desecrator, we consecrate the
flag as a symbol of liberty. From this day forward, our Nation can condemn
other nations that limit dissent, secure in the knowledge that our own house is in
order." While prudence, self-restraint, and an appropriate sense of judicial mod-
esty may have precluded such language, the Court's decision has raised, not
lowered, the significance of Old Glory.
1 7
Before concluding that the first amendment protected Johnson's flag burn-
ing, the Court had to determine that it was speech. Although Texas conceded
that Johnson had engaged in "expressive conduct,"' 18 the Court felt it necessary
to demonstrate the prudence of that concession. It quoted Johnson's explana-
tion for his conduct: "The American Flag was burned as Ronald Reagan was
being renominated as President. And a more powerful statement of symbolic
speech, whether you agree with it or not, couldn't have been made at that time.
It's quite a just position [juxtaposition]. We had new patriotism and no patriot-
ism."' 9 With Johnson's explanation in the record, the Court had no difficulty
concluding that the first amendment was implicated.
Although Johnson was engaged in symbolic speech, the Court emphasized
that "[t]he Government generally has a freer hand in restricting expressive con-
duct than it has in restricting the written or spoken word."' 20 Relying on United
States v. O'Brien,2 ' a case that upheld a conviction for burning a draft card, the
Court reaffirmed its rejection of "the view that an apparently limitless variety of
conduct can be labeled 'speech' whenever the person engaging in the conduct
intends thereby to express an idea."'22 What differentiated Johnson, however,
was that the flag burner was punished, not in spite of his message, but because of
his message. As the Court succinctly put it: "[Government] may not ... pro-
scribe particular conduct because it has expressive elements."
'23
The Court made short work of Texas' claimed justification for the statute.
Texas first argued that the statute was necessary to prevent a breach of the
peace. In response, the Court emphasized that the state introduced no evidence
suggesting that the peace was either breached or likely to be breached. 24 Texas
also argued that the flag should be preserved as a symbol of national unity, but
the Court found this claim to be related to the content of Johnson's expression
16. Johnson, 109 S. Ct. at 2547-48.
17. The same cannot be said for those public officials (including the President) who would
overturn Johnson by constitutional amendment. See, e.g., What Price Old Glory?, TIME, July 10,
1989, at 23; see also infra text accompanying notes 59-60 (discussing the implications of such an
amendment).
18. Johnson, 109 S. Ct. at 2543.
19. Id. at 2540 (quoting the record in the case).
20. Id.
21. 391 U.S. 367 (1968).
22. Johnson, 109 S. Ct. at 2539 (quoting O'Brien, 391 U.S. at 376).
23. Id. at 2540.
24. Id. at 2541.
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and therefore impermissible. 25 The Court did not deny the state's interest in
encouraging proper respect for the flag-indeed it affirmed that interest. The
Court held, however, that compulsion was not a constitutionally permissible
means to encourage that end.
2 6
III. THE DISSENTS
Much of Chief Justice Rehnquist's dissent supports the communicative na-
ture of the flag. The Chief Justice quite poignantly portrayed the flag's symbolic
significance by skillfully interweaving Concord Hymn, The Star Spangled Ban-
ner, and Barbara Frietchie,27 causing at least this commentator to shed a tear
over Barbara Frietchie's symbolic heroism. Such illustrations confirm the
Court's judgment that one who burns what symbolizes so much is conveying a
deep disrespect for this nation that probably cannot be expressed so clearly in
any other way. If any words could convey contempt for our country as well as
the burning of the symbol for which Barbara Frietchie would have sacrificed her
old grey head, I have yet to hear them.
Perhaps the core of the Chief Justice's opinion is his assertion that "[t]he
flag is not simply another 'idea' or 'point of view' competing for recognition in
the marketplace of ideas."'28 If he is right about that then he is right about the
case. But he is not right about that! More than forty-five years ago, in another
case involving the flag,29 Justice Jackson, typically regarded as a conservative
jurist, announced what has become core first amendment doctrine: "If there is
any fixed star in our constitutional constellation, it is that no official, high or
petty, can prescribe what shall be orthodox in politics, nationalism, religion, or
other matters of opinion or force citizens to confess by word or act their faith
therein."
30
Because the Chief Justice did not view the flag as a participant in the mar-
ketplace of ideas, he found it unnecessary to respond to Justice Jackson's classic
admonition. Justice Stevens' dissent, however, does attempt an answer. After
first noting the obvious absence of compulsion to support the flag, Stevens
contended:
The content of [Johnson's] message has no relevance whatsoever to the
case. The concept of 'desecration' does not turn on the substance of
the message the actor intends to convey, but rather on whether those
who view the act will take serious offense. Accordingly, one intending
to convey a message of respect for the flag by burning it in a public
square might nonetheless be guilty of desecration if he knows that
others-perhaps simply because they misperceive the intended
message-will be seriously offended. Indeed, even if the actor knows
that all possible witnesses will understand that he intends to send a
25. Id. at 2542.
26. Id. at 2547.
27. Id. at 2548-50 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting).
28. Id. at 2552 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting).
29. West Virginia Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624 (1943).
30. Id. at 642.
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message of respect, he might still be guilty of desecration if he also
knows that this understanding does not lessen the offense taken by
some of the witnesses. Thus this is not a case in which the fact that "it
is the speaker's opinion that gives offense" provides a special "reason
for according it constitutional protection."
'3'
Stevens deserves credit for at least trying to respond to the constitutional
prohibition against prescribed orthodoxy. Clearly, however, a statute prohibit-
ing burning a cross or wearing a swastika that the actor knows will seriously
offend one or more persons likely to observe or discover his actions is based on
the substance of the speaker's message. Laws prohibiting flag burning, cross
burning, and swastika wearing are all predicated on the offensiveness of the
message. Thus, unless Rehnquist's withdrawal from the marketplace of ideas
theory is justifiable, both dissenting opinions are indefensible.
The Chief Justice offered three arguments in his dissent. First, he argued by
analogy to San Francisco Arts & Athletics, Inc. v. United States Olympic Commit-
tee,32 in which the Court had held that the USOC's work in developing the
Olympics entitled them to exclusive use of the name, thereby allowing them to
obtain an injunction against the San Francisco group's attempt to sponsor an
event known as the "Gay Olympics."'3 3 Rehnquist concluded: "Surely Con-
gress or the States may recognize a similar interest in the flag."'34 The problem
is that the interests are not similar. Without question, after the San Francisco
decision, a "Gay Olympics" committee member could have burned the Olympic
flag in disgust. Similarly, if Gregory Johnson had flown the American flag over
his international Communist office and labeled it "International Division of the
United States Government," I have little doubt that he could have been en-
joined. Misleading labels can be proscribed; criticism cannot.
Rehnquist next argued that Johnson's flag burning "was no essential part of
any exposition of ideas, and at the same time it had a tendency to incite a breach
of the peace."'35 This statement intenveaves three separate arguments. First,
flag burning is not essential because there are other ways of conveying the same
message. Standing alone, of course, this argument is irrelevant since there are
always other ways to convey a message. If a message can be conveyed by four
different methods, no one of them would be necessary because the speaker could
have used one of the other three. For this reason, the Court has said that "one is
not to have the exercise of his liberty of expression in appropriate places
abridged on the plea that it may be exercised in some other place."'3 6 Presuma-
bly, this reasoning applies to alternate means of expression as well as alternate
locales.
31. Johnson, 109 S. Ct. at 2557 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (quoting FCC v. Pacifica Found., 438
U.S. 726, 745 (1978) (plurality opinion)).
32. 483 U.S. 522 (1987).
33. Id. at 528.
34. Johnson, 109 S. Ct. at 2552 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting).
35. Id. at 2553 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting) (citing Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S.
568, 571-72 (1942)).
36. Schneider v. State, 308 U.S. 147, 163 (1939).
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Second, because of flag burning's potential to cause a breach of the peace, it
is analogous to fighting words and is therefore an inappropriate method of ex-
pression. This reasoning is beset by classic problems of both overinclusion and
underinclusion. It is overinclusive because it includes many flag burnings, such
as the one at bar, that did not threaten a breach of the peace. It is underinclu-
sive because it excludes many other symbols, such as a Ku Klux Klan burning
cross or a Nazi swastika, that also may cause a breach of the peace. Moreover,
the Court's observation that Texas already has a breach of the peace statute
confirms "that Texas need not punish this flag desecration in order to keep the
peace."
37
Finally, the Chief Justice points to the alleged ineffectiveness of Johnson's
protest. Rehnquist contends that Johnson's act of flag burning "conveyed noth-
ing that could not have been conveyed and was not conveyed just as forcefully in
a dozen different ways [and] is the equivalent of an inarticulate grunt or roar."
'38
To the extent that the Chief Justice is arguing that flag burning is a particularly
bad way to persuade the average American that America is rotten to the core, he
is, of course, correct. It was not Johnson's intent to persuade the average Amer-
ican, however. Instead, he sought to convey the depth of his disgust with
America, and I would like to see even one of the Chief Justice's rhetorical
"dozen different ways" by which Johnson could have conveyed the depth of his
disgust as forcefully.
Rehnquist next recounted the belief of former Justices Warren, Black, and
Fortas that flag burning may be punished. He quoted Warren and Black simply
to indicate their beliefs. 39 He noted that Justice Fortas once wrote: "'A flag
may be property, in a sense; but it is property burdened with peculiar obligations
and restrictions. Certainly... these special conditions are notper se arbitrary or
beyond governmental power under our Constitution.' "40 Whatever else might
be said of the Fortas quote (and it was from a dissenting opinion), it is not a
carefully crafted argument. The statement presumes no need for reasoned justi-
fication and, consequently, provides none.
Borrowing from an earlier opinion by Justice White, 4 1 the Chief Justice
then argued that "[t]here would seem to be little question about the power of
Congress to forbid mutilation of the Lincoln Memorial. The flag is itself a mon-
ument, subject to similar protection." 42 There are, however, two major distinc-
tions between mutilation of the Lincoln Memorial and Johnson's flag burning.
First, the monument mutilator's act is criminal irrespective of her viewpoint.
She should be punished even if she extolled the virtues of the United States in
37. Johnson, 109 S. Ct. at 2542. For a more detailed explanation of the inapplicability of the
fighting words doctrine to flag desecration, see Loewy, Punishing Flag Desecrators: The Ultimate in
Flag Desecration, 49 N.C.L. REv. 48, 80-84 (1970).
38. Johnson, 109 S. Ct. at 2553 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting).
39. Id. at 2554 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting).
40. Id. (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting) (quoting Street v. New York, 394 U.S. 576, 616-17 (1969)
(Fortas, J., dissenting)).
41. Smith v. Goguen, 415 U.S. 566, 587 (1974) (White, J., concurring).
42. Johnson, 109 S. Ct. at 2555 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting).
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luminous spray paint on the Lincoln Memorial. Second, the United States owns
the one defaced Lincoln Memorial. A protester could not be punished for defac-
ing her own model of the Lincoln Memorial. 43 Conversely, one can and should
be punished for defacing a flag owned by the United States Government."
In his penultimate paragraph, Rehnquist excoriated the Court for "con-
clud[ing] its opinion with a regrettably patronizing civics lecture."4 5 He then
concluded the paragraph with his own civics lecture: "Surely one of the high
purposes of a democratic society is to legislate against conduct that is regarded
as evil and profoundly offensive to the majority of people-whether it be mur-
der, embezzlement, pollution, or flag burning." 46 Democratic theory, of course,
expects elected representatives to decide when and how to punish killers, thieves,
and those who despoil the environment. It does not, however, contemplate ma-
jority control of minority expression. A Justice who chastises his brethren for
giving a civics lecture at least ought to take care that his own lecture is good
civics. The Court's was; Rehnquist's was not.
In conclusion, Rehnquist laments that "[t]he government may conscript
men into the Armed Forces where they must fight and perhaps die for the flag,
but the government may not prohibit the public burning of the banner under
which they fight."' 47 Even more poignantly, Justice Stevens concluded his dis-
sent with the following:
The ideas of liberty and equality have been an irresistible force in moti-
vating leaders like Patrick Henry, Susan B. Anthony, and Abraham
Lincoln, schoolteachers like Nathan Hale and Booker T. Washington,
the Phillipine Scouts who fought at Bataan, and the soldiers who
scaled the bluff at Omaha Beach. If those ideas are worth fighting
for-and our history demonstrates that they are-it cannot be true
that the flag that uniquely symbolizes their power is not itself worthy
of protection from unnecessary desecration.
48
Stevens, unlike Rehnquist, at least recognized that our heroes fought for the
ideas represented by the flag, and not for the flag itself. Unfortunately, his last
clause is a non sequitur. The appropriate concluding sentence should have been:
"If those ideas are worth fighting for-and our history demonstrates that they
are-it must be true that the flag that uniquely symbolizes their power cannot be
made the symbol of oppression by prosecuting those who foolishly believe that
our flag does not represent these cherished values."
It is understandable that our President, Congress, legislators, and general
populace who do not regularly study the first amendment would initially con-
43. This point was made by David Cole, Johnson's attorney, on Nightline: Flag Burning (ABC
television broadcast, June 29, 1989) (videotape on file with the author).
44. Ironically, the flag that Johnson burned was stolen. See Johnson, 109 S. Ct. at 2536. Con-
sequently, he should have been subject to criminal punishment. The Government did not make that
an issue in the case. Thus, the case was decided on the assumption that the flag was his own. See
infra text accompanying notes 52-54.
45. Johnson, 109 S. Ct. at 2555 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting).
46. Id. (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting).
47. Id. (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting).
48. Id. at 2557 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
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demn the Johnson decision. It is more difficult to rationalize the opinions of the
Supreme Court dissenters who really ought to know better.
IV. IRONIES, PARADOXES, AND ENIGMAS
Rarely has any case been as beset with ironies, paradoxes, and enigmas as
this one. By upholding the reversal of Johnson's conviction, the Supreme Court
provided powerful evidence that Johnson's postarrest complaints about the
country's intolerance to dissent were unjustified. Those who have attempted to
overturn the decision by constitutional amendment or legislation, on the other
hand, lend support to Johnson's claim of United States' intolerance.
Similarly, those who have contended that flag burning is not speech have
proven that it is. For example, President Bush's visceral reaction to flag burn-
ing49 is strikingly parallel to the Ayatollah Khomeini's reaction to Rushdie's
novel.50 Those citizens who would threaten violence to flag burners bear a
frightening resemblance to the Islamic faithful who have threatened those selling
The Satanic Verses.51 The reaction to flag burning of those Americans who
claim that flag burning is not speech closely parallels the reaction of the Islamic
faithful to a book that undoubtedly is speech, and paradoxically proves that flag
burning is in fact speech.
Yet another irony is that Johnson could have been convicted of a real crime
if the Government had focused on what he did rather than on his offensive man-
ner of displaying contempt for the nation. He was with a group that spray-
painted several buildings, overturned potted plants, and stole an American flag
from one of the buildings.52 Johnson's association with the group quite proba-
bly would have been sufficient to impose liability,53 thereby rendering this case
truly analogous to spray-painting the Lincoln Memorial. In any event, he
clearly destroyed property that he knew was stolen. Yet the government's insis-
tence on prosecuting Johnson for flag burning transformed him from the petty
vandal that he was into a first amendment hero complete with a national televi-
sion appearance on "Nightline."
54
Further irony inheres in the timing of this case. In 1982 the Court denied
certiorari in Kime v. United States,55 a case remarkably similar to Johnson, ex-
cept that in Kime the Fourth Circuit had affirmed the flag-burning conviction.
Consequently, when the Court granted certiorari in Johnson to review a flag-
burning conviction that had been overturned, there was good reason to believe
that the Court intended to reinstate the conviction.
Indeed, if the 1982 Court had heard Kime, it almost certainly would have
49. See supra note 17.
50. See supra notes 13-14 and accompanying text. This comparison must be tempered by the
President's moderation and sense of procedural due process.
51. See Smith, supra note 13, at 38.
52. Johnson, 109 S. Ct. at 2536.
53. See, e.g., Tarpley v. State, 565 S.W.2d 525 (Tex. Crim. App. 1978).
54. See supra note 43.
55. 673 F.2d 1318 (4th. Cir.), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 949 (1982).
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upheld the conviction. The 1982 Court consisted of the four Johnson dissent-
ers56 plus then Chief Justice Burger, whose prior dissenting opinion indicated
that he would have upheld a flag desecration conviction. 57 Thus, had Brennan's
dissenting effort to grant certiorari succeeded, the Constitution likely would
have permitted punishment for flag burning. The question was left open for the
current Court to constitutionalize the practice only because those Justices who
wanted flag burning to be punished voted to deny certiorari in Kime.
If these ironies weren't enough, the two Justices that swung the Johnson
decision were Scalia and Kennedy, appointees who were attractive to President
Reagan largely because of their conservative judicial philosophies. Maybe this is
not so ironic, however, since conservative Justices are supposed to believe in
strict construction of the Constitution, and one could hardly be more strict than
to take the words of the first amendment seriously even when they hurt. As
Justice Kennedy put it: "The hard fact is that sometimes we must make deci-
sions we do not like. We make them because they are right, right in the sense
that the law and the Constitution, as we see them, compel the result."
5 8
Perhaps the ultimate irony is that Johnson has done more to preserve the
flag as a symbol of liberty than any prior decision, while the decision's detractors
would allow real desecration of the flag by making it a symbol of political
oppression.
V. THE HIDDEN DANGERS OF A CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENT
OR STATUTE
Many of the arguments against a constitutional amendment or statute to
overturn Johnson have already been explored. There are some hidden dangers,
however, that may be even more ominous than those previously described.
By exempting only the American flag from desecration, we set that icon
above all others. What does that say to the Holocaust survivor in Skokie, Illi-
nois, who is told that despite her pain at the sight of Nazi marchers, the first
amendment demands that she tolerate their uniforms and swastikas?5 9 What
does it say to the black man who feels the same about hoods and sheets and
burning crosses, but is told that the first amendment demands tolerance?
60 It
says that a majority of Americans can prevent the most painful attack possible
on our sensibilities by constitutionalizing the right to punish the dissident that
dares attack us. But those who for good reason have found a symbol other than
a burning flag to be the most horrid attack upon them must tolerate it. This
should not comfort those who truly believe in the flag's values.
If one were to suggest a more sweeping amendment forbidding all symbolic
hatred, where could we draw the line? Would Republicans not be allowed to
56. The four dissenters were Chief Justice Rehnquist, and Justices White, Stevens, and
O'Connor. Johnson, 109 S. Ct. 2536.
57. See Spence v. Washington, 418 U.S. 405, 416 (1974) (Burger, C.J., dissenting).
58. Johnson, 109 S. Ct. at 2548 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
59. See Collin v. Smith, 578 F.2d 1197 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 916 (1978).
60. See Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444 (1969).
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desecrate donkeys, nor Democrats be allowed to desecrate elephants? If we do
not eliminate all symbolic hatred, we surely will exclude from protection some-
one whose pain would be equal to the average American seeing a burning flag, a
Holocaust survivor seeing a swastika, or a black man seeing a burning cross. If
we do outlaw all of these things, what becomes of our boast of freedom? Do we
not then emulate the dictatorships we despise? We may become a kinder and
gentler nation, and the Star Spangled Banner may still wave, but it would not be
o'er the land of the free, nor the home of the brave.
The Supreme Court has struck a major blow for freedom in Johnson. Even
if the Court were wrong, any constitutional amendment or statute that could be
enacted would do more harm than good. The Court was not wrong, however.
It did more to preserve the integrity of the flag than any of its critics. We should
be thankful that prudence prevailed over passion and leave well enough alone.

